Iemen está adotando as IFRSs
Diversidade de gênero em economia
As edições dos verbetes da Wikipedia fazem a enciclopédia menos enviesada
Como o computador ajuda o jogador de xadrez
23 novembro 2016
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Iemen está adotando as IFRSs
Diversidade de gênero em economia
As edições dos verbetes da Wikipedia fazem a enciclopédia menos enviesada
Como o computador ajuda o jogador de xadrez
Intelectual, mas idiota!
But the problem is the one-eyed following the blind: these self-described members of the “intelligentsia” can’t find a coconut in Coconut Island, meaning they aren’t intelligent enough to define intelligence hence fall into circularities — but their main skill is capacity to pass exams written by people like them. With psychology papers replicating less than 40%, dietary advice reversing after 30 years of fatphobia, macroeconomic analysis working worse than astrology, the appointment of Bernanke who was less than clueless of the risks, and pharmaceutical trials replicating at best only 1/3 of the time, people are perfectly entitled to rely on their own ancestral instinct and listen to their grandmothers (or Montaigne and such filtered classical knowledge) with a better track record than these policymaking goons.
Indeed one can see that these academico-bureaucrats who feel entitled to run our lives aren’t even rigorous, whether in medical statistics or policymaking. They can’t tell science from scientism — in fact in their image-oriented minds scientism looks more scientific than real science. (For instance it is trivial to show the following: much of what the Cass-Sunstein-Richard Thaler types — those who want to “nudge” us into some behavior — much of what they would classify as “rational” or “irrational” (or some such categories indicating deviation from a desired or prescribed protocol) comes from their misunderstanding of probability theory and cosmetic use of first-order models.) They are also prone to mistake the ensemble for the linear aggregation of its components.
The Intellectual Yet Idiot is a production of modernity hence has been accelerating since the mid twentieth century, to reach its local supremum today, along with the broad category of people without skin-in-the-game who have been invading many walks of life. Why? Simply, in most countries, the government’s role is between five and ten times what it was a century ago (expressed in percentage of GDP). The IYI seems ubiquitous in our lives but is still a small minority and is rarely seen outside specialized outlets, think tanks, the media, and universities — most people have proper jobs and there are not many openings for the IYI.
Beware the semi-erudite who thinks he is an erudite. He fails to naturally detect sophistry.
The IYI pathologizes others for doing things he doesn’t understand without ever realizing it is his understanding that may be limited. He thinks people should act according to their best interests and he knows their interests, particularly if they are “red necks” or English non-crisp-vowel class who voted for Brexit. When plebeians do something that makes sense to them, but not to him, the IYI uses the term “uneducated”. What we generally call participation in the political process, he calls by two distinct designations: “democracy” when it fits the IYI, and “populism” when the plebeians dare voting in a way that contradicts his preferences. While rich people believe in one tax dollar one vote, more humanistic ones in one man one vote, Monsanto in one lobbyist one vote, the IYI believes in one Ivy League degree one-vote, with some equivalence for foreign elite schools and PhDs as these are needed in the club.
[...]
The IYI has been wrong, historically, on Stalinism, Maoism, GMOs, Iraq, Libya, Syria, lobotomies, urban planning, low carbohydrate diets, gym machines, behaviorism, transfats, freudianism, portfolio theory, linear regression, Gaussianism, Salafism, dynamic stochastic equilibrium modeling, housing projects, selfish gene, election forecasting models, Bernie Madoff (pre-blowup) and p-values. But he is convinced that his current position is right.
The IYI is member of a club to get traveling privileges; if social scientist he uses statistics without knowing how they are derived (like Steven Pinker and psycholophasters in general); when in the UK, he goes to literary festivals; he drinks red wine with steak (never white); he used to believe that fat was harmful and has now completely reversed; he takes statins because his doctor told him to do so; he fails to understand ergodicity and when explained to him, he forgets about it soon later; he doesn’t use Yiddish words even when talking business; he studies grammar before speaking a language; he has a cousin who worked with someone who knows the Queen; he has never read Frederic Dard, Libanius Antiochus, Michael Oakeshot, John Gray, Amianus Marcellinus, Ibn Battuta, Saadiah Gaon, or Joseph De Maistre; he has never gotten drunk with Russians; he never drank to the point when one starts breaking glasses (or, preferably, chairs); he doesn’t even know the difference between Hecate and Hecuba (which in Brooklynese is “can’t tell sh**t from shinola”); he doesn’t know that there is no difference between “pseudointellectual” and “intellectual” in the absence of skin in the game; has mentioned quantum mechanics at least twice in the past five years in conversations that had nothing to do with physics.
He knows at any point in time what his words or actions are doing to his reputation.
But a much easier marker: he doesn’t even deadlift.
The IYI is member of a club to get traveling privileges; if social scientist he uses statistics without knowing how they are derived (like Steven Pinker and psycholophasters in general); when in the UK, he goes to literary festivals; he drinks red wine with steak (never white); he used to believe that fat was harmful and has now completely reversed; he takes statins because his doctor told him to do so; he fails to understand ergodicity and when explained to him, he forgets about it soon later; he doesn’t use Yiddish words even when talking business; he studies grammar before speaking a language; he has a cousin who worked with someone who knows the Queen; he has never read Frederic Dard, Libanius Antiochus, Michael Oakeshot, John Gray, Amianus Marcellinus, Ibn Battuta, Saadiah Gaon, or Joseph De Maistre; he has never gotten drunk with Russians; he never drank to the point when one starts breaking glasses (or, preferably, chairs); he doesn’t even know the difference between Hecate and Hecuba (which in Brooklynese is “can’t tell sh**t from shinola”); he doesn’t know that there is no difference between “pseudointellectual” and “intellectual” in the absence of skin in the game; has mentioned quantum mechanics at least twice in the past five years in conversations that had nothing to do with physics.
He knows at any point in time what his words or actions are doing to his reputation.
But a much easier marker: he doesn’t even deadlift.
Fonte: aqui
22 novembro 2016
Normas contábeis para o Bitcoin
The Australian government’s financial reporting standards agency is pushing for international action in the area of digital currencies.
The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB), a government agency tasked with overseeing the country’s reporting standards, has published a new position paper ahead of a December meeting of members from the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In sum, the paper argues that a more defined standard is needed both for digital currencies as well as other kinds of intangible assets.
The question of accounting standards has come up in the past, but the AASB’s paper might be one of the more consequential to date. Its release comes amid a controversial move by the Internal Revenue Service, the top US tax agency, to seek user records from digital currency exchange Coinbase.
According to the AASB paper, “clear” guidance is needed by accountants working with individuals or companies that handle digital currencies.
The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB), a government agency tasked with overseeing the country’s reporting standards, has published a new position paper ahead of a December meeting of members from the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In sum, the paper argues that a more defined standard is needed both for digital currencies as well as other kinds of intangible assets.
The question of accounting standards has come up in the past, but the AASB’s paper might be one of the more consequential to date. Its release comes amid a controversial move by the Internal Revenue Service, the top US tax agency, to seek user records from digital currency exchange Coinbase.
According to the AASB paper, “clear” guidance is needed by accountants working with individuals or companies that handle digital currencies.
[...]
Fonte: aqui
21 novembro 2016
Um estudo sobre fraudes
Um grande estudo realizado pela Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) trouxe algumas conclusões relevantes. O estudo, em PDF e inglês, pode ser encontrado aqui
A forma mais comum de fraude foi a apropriação indevida de ativos, incluindo esquemas relacionados com o faturamento da organização, correspondeu a 83% dos casos relatados e perda mediana de 125 mil dólares. Já as fraudes nas demonstrações financeiras representaram somente 10% dos casos, mas o valor mediano foi de quase um milhão de dólares. Os casos de corrupção representam 35% do total, com perda mediana de 200 mil dólares.
Há uma relação entre o tempo de duração da fraude e seu impacto financeiro.
O método mais comum de descoberta de fraude foi a dica (39%), principalmente nas entidades que tinham “hotlines” (linhas diretas). Mas várias fraudes foram descobertas pela detecção ativa (vigilância, conciliação de contas); neste caso, a perda foi menor do que nos casos onde a detecão foi passiva (notificação de terceiro ou descoberta acidental).
As fraudes ocorreram tanto nas empresas de capital aberto quanto fechado, nas entidades do primeiro, segundo e terceiro setor e nas empresas de grande e pequeno porte. Um fato interessante é que as fraudes em pequenas entidades tiveram perdas próximas das grandes; obviamente que o impacto nas pequenas foi muito maior. Mas o tipo de fraude era diferente: nas grandes, a corrupção; esquemas de falsificação, roubo de dinheiro e outros estavam mais presentes nas pequenas entidades.
Após a ocorrência de fraudes, a principal medida foi a auditoria externa independente. Mas se já existia controles o valor era menor e a detecção mais rápida. Os fraudadores estavam com dificuldades financeiras, com problemas familiares, associação estreita com vendedor ou cliente, entre outros sintomas. Mas a maioria eram marinheiros de primeira viagem. Em 41% dos casos, o fato foi abafado, para evitar publicidade ruim.
Finalmente, a fonte principal da fraude foi no departamento de contabilidade, com quase 17% dos casos.
A forma mais comum de fraude foi a apropriação indevida de ativos, incluindo esquemas relacionados com o faturamento da organização, correspondeu a 83% dos casos relatados e perda mediana de 125 mil dólares. Já as fraudes nas demonstrações financeiras representaram somente 10% dos casos, mas o valor mediano foi de quase um milhão de dólares. Os casos de corrupção representam 35% do total, com perda mediana de 200 mil dólares.
Há uma relação entre o tempo de duração da fraude e seu impacto financeiro.
O método mais comum de descoberta de fraude foi a dica (39%), principalmente nas entidades que tinham “hotlines” (linhas diretas). Mas várias fraudes foram descobertas pela detecção ativa (vigilância, conciliação de contas); neste caso, a perda foi menor do que nos casos onde a detecão foi passiva (notificação de terceiro ou descoberta acidental).
As fraudes ocorreram tanto nas empresas de capital aberto quanto fechado, nas entidades do primeiro, segundo e terceiro setor e nas empresas de grande e pequeno porte. Um fato interessante é que as fraudes em pequenas entidades tiveram perdas próximas das grandes; obviamente que o impacto nas pequenas foi muito maior. Mas o tipo de fraude era diferente: nas grandes, a corrupção; esquemas de falsificação, roubo de dinheiro e outros estavam mais presentes nas pequenas entidades.
Após a ocorrência de fraudes, a principal medida foi a auditoria externa independente. Mas se já existia controles o valor era menor e a detecção mais rápida. Os fraudadores estavam com dificuldades financeiras, com problemas familiares, associação estreita com vendedor ou cliente, entre outros sintomas. Mas a maioria eram marinheiros de primeira viagem. Em 41% dos casos, o fato foi abafado, para evitar publicidade ruim.
Finalmente, a fonte principal da fraude foi no departamento de contabilidade, com quase 17% dos casos.
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