19 agosto 2016
18 agosto 2016
Sobrepreço na Petrobras mostra que a empresa foi conservadora
Em auditorias anteriores foi apurado dano potencial ao erário no montante de R$ 2,1 bilhões, em valores atualizados. Esse valor foi obtido com a análise do superfaturamento decorrente de preços excessivos verificados nos contratos originalmente firmados. Não foram analisados, ainda, quantitativos decorrentes de aditivos contratuais nas duas obras.
O objetivo do processo atual foi apurar o valor exato do prejuízo e imputá-lo aos responsáveis envolvidos. Na avaliação, o tribunal constatou que o montante do prejuízo superou o valor dos pagamentos indevidos aos agentes da Petrobras. Isso porque tais pagamentos ilícitos afetaram a lisura das licitações, permitindo a cartelização e a prática de preços acima dos de mercado pelas empresas contratadas.
O dano constatado foi dividido em duas parcelas, a primeira é referente à diferença entre os preços contratados e o valor da estimativa de custo da Petrobrás. A outra parte do superfaturamento é oriunda da diferença entre o orçamento estimativo da Petrobrás e os valores de referência utilizados pelo TCU.
Os percentuais dos sobrepreços apropriados nos contratos da UDA e UHDT são da ordem de 69% e 88%, respectivamente. Além disso, foram verificados o recebimento de vantagens indevidas sobre o valor total dos contratos e a prática de diversos atos que direcionaram as licitações. Entre eles estão a divulgação de informações sigilosas da Petrobras, a não-inclusão de novos concorrentes após o cancelamento de um procedimento licitatório por preços excessivos e a omissão para evitar que o cartel de empresas obtivesse contratos com o valor próximo ao limite máximo permitido pela Petrobras.
Isto reforça a tese deste blog que o valor estimado pela empresa Petrobras para fazer a amortização referente a corrupção foi baixo.
O fim da contabilidade tradicional e um novo caminho para investidores e gestores
Baruch Lev, Israel-born accounting professor at NYU’s Stern School of Business, has long been a skeptic of traditional corporate accounting.
His contention is that generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, have lost their relevance over the last 40 years. The industrial economy, he says, with its emphasis on physical assets of property, plant and equipment, and inventory levels has been supplanted by a new economy in which intangible assets like research and development, information technology, unique business franchises, and powerful brands rule the roost.
The problem, according to the 77-year- old Lev, is that GAAP hasn’t evolved sufficiently to capture this new reality despite the fact that academic studies show that companies since the 1990s spend more on intangible assets and harder-to-quantify strategic assets—brand development, advertising and marketing, unique personal talents, and the like—than on Rust Belt–like hard assets.
His contention is that generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, have lost their relevance over the last 40 years. The industrial economy, he says, with its emphasis on physical assets of property, plant and equipment, and inventory levels has been supplanted by a new economy in which intangible assets like research and development, information technology, unique business franchises, and powerful brands rule the roost.
The problem, according to the 77-year- old Lev, is that GAAP hasn’t evolved sufficiently to capture this new reality despite the fact that academic studies show that companies since the 1990s spend more on intangible assets and harder-to-quantify strategic assets—brand development, advertising and marketing, unique personal talents, and the like—than on Rust Belt–like hard assets.
[...]
Fonte: aqui
Resenha do livro:
Flaws in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) severely limit the usefulness of financial reporting to security analysts. The following are examples:
-Under GAAP, a company that laid out huge sums for brand creation shows zero value for those investments on its balance sheet. In contrast, billions of dollars of assets may appear on the balance sheet of a competitor after it acquires a company that made similar outlays. This inconsistent accounting treatment confounds investors who seek to compare companies for valuation purposes.
-GAAP requires expensing of R&D (research and development) costs as incurred, yet studies show that investors regard these expenditures as assets that add to a company’s value. Mandatory expensing probably also depresses R&D spending.
-GAAP violates the traditional concept of matching revenues and expenses. For example, wireless telecommunications companies must match single-year revenues with customer-acquisition expenditures that are expected to produce benefits for three to four years. Their true economic profits are consequently understated.
In view of such serious shortcomings, should it surprise anyone that the earnings derived through traditional accounting are a second-rate influence on stock prices? The End of Accounting and the Path Forward for Investors and Managers shows that equity investors can earn far higher investment returns by correctly forecasting cash flows than by correctly forecasting GAAP earnings. Furthermore, cash flows are easier to predict than earnings, which increasingly consist of dubious GAAP-mandated accounting estimates.
The connection between GAAP and equity valuations is not only loose but loosening. During the past 60-plus years, a sharp and steady decline has occurred in the correlation between stock prices and such key accounting outputs as earnings, book value, sales, cost of sales, assets, and liabilities. Baruch Lev, professor of accounting and finance at the Stern School of Business at New York University, and Feng Gu, associate professor and chair of the Department of Accounting and Law at the University at Buffalo, attribute this decline to the transition from a primarily industrial economy to the information age.
“The major value drivers shifted from property, plant, machinery, and inventories, to patents, brands, information technology, and human resources,” write the authors. GAAP, failing to adapt to this change, continued to treat the latter four value creators as ordinary expenses. That accounting, say Lev and Gu, distorted both the balance sheets and the income statements of intellectually based companies, rendering reported financial information increasingly irrelevant.
To fix this problem, the authors audaciously propose a radical overhaul of the accounting system. Their new model addresses the fact that, by the authors’ estimate, today’s financial reporting supplies a mere 5% of the information used by investors. Lev and Gu seek to complement traditional financial statements with a “Strategic Resources & Consequences Report” focused on the items that create a sustained economic advantage. This report would present details on such things as patents, oil reserves, and information technology—all in a standardized form, rather than the haphazard disclosures already made by some public companies—to facilitate comparison of issuers within an industry.
Lev and Gu seek, above all, to improve on GAAP’s measurement of value creation by focusing the proposed report on cash flows. In their system, companies would not only capitalize R&D but would also provide a breakdown separating research (i.e., the systematic pursuit of new knowledge) and development (i.e., the use of research to develop new products or processes). Additionally, a charge for the cost of equity capital would be deducted from cash flows. Where feasible, changes in values of major strategic assets, such as the present value of cash flows from proven oil and gas reserves, would be taken into account.
The authors recognize and deal effectively with objections to their innovations. These objections include an increased reporting burden (which they suggest might be partly offset by dispensing with quarterly reporting in favor of semiannual statements) and companies’ predictable complaint that they would be forced to divulge proprietary information to competitors. Lev and Gu prefer to have their reforms come about through demand from investors rather than by government fiat, although they would welcome the US SEC’s support of their project.
Lev and Gu differentiate their remedies from others that have been proposed, such as “key performance indicators” and the “triple bottom line,” which tracks management’s impact on people and the planet as well as on profits. Their reconstruction of financial statements does, however, bear some similarity to economic value added (EVA).1 Both approaches take into account the cost of equity capital, although Lev and Gu’s starting point is cash flows whereas EVA’s is earnings.
The End of Accounting makes a powerful case for redirecting security analysis away from GAAP accounting. Already, the authors note, between 2003 and 2013, the proportion of public companies reporting non-GAAP (“pro forma”) earnings doubled from 20% to 40%. How can this phenomenon be explained, they ask, other than as a function of company managers’ awareness of the rapidly diminishing usefulness of financial information to investors? Actually, there is an alternative narrative—namely, that corporate executives benefit when their bonuses are calculated on the basis of non-GAAP rather than (lower) GAAP earnings
-Under GAAP, a company that laid out huge sums for brand creation shows zero value for those investments on its balance sheet. In contrast, billions of dollars of assets may appear on the balance sheet of a competitor after it acquires a company that made similar outlays. This inconsistent accounting treatment confounds investors who seek to compare companies for valuation purposes.
-GAAP requires expensing of R&D (research and development) costs as incurred, yet studies show that investors regard these expenditures as assets that add to a company’s value. Mandatory expensing probably also depresses R&D spending.
-GAAP violates the traditional concept of matching revenues and expenses. For example, wireless telecommunications companies must match single-year revenues with customer-acquisition expenditures that are expected to produce benefits for three to four years. Their true economic profits are consequently understated.
In view of such serious shortcomings, should it surprise anyone that the earnings derived through traditional accounting are a second-rate influence on stock prices? The End of Accounting and the Path Forward for Investors and Managers shows that equity investors can earn far higher investment returns by correctly forecasting cash flows than by correctly forecasting GAAP earnings. Furthermore, cash flows are easier to predict than earnings, which increasingly consist of dubious GAAP-mandated accounting estimates.
The connection between GAAP and equity valuations is not only loose but loosening. During the past 60-plus years, a sharp and steady decline has occurred in the correlation between stock prices and such key accounting outputs as earnings, book value, sales, cost of sales, assets, and liabilities. Baruch Lev, professor of accounting and finance at the Stern School of Business at New York University, and Feng Gu, associate professor and chair of the Department of Accounting and Law at the University at Buffalo, attribute this decline to the transition from a primarily industrial economy to the information age.
“The major value drivers shifted from property, plant, machinery, and inventories, to patents, brands, information technology, and human resources,” write the authors. GAAP, failing to adapt to this change, continued to treat the latter four value creators as ordinary expenses. That accounting, say Lev and Gu, distorted both the balance sheets and the income statements of intellectually based companies, rendering reported financial information increasingly irrelevant.
To fix this problem, the authors audaciously propose a radical overhaul of the accounting system. Their new model addresses the fact that, by the authors’ estimate, today’s financial reporting supplies a mere 5% of the information used by investors. Lev and Gu seek to complement traditional financial statements with a “Strategic Resources & Consequences Report” focused on the items that create a sustained economic advantage. This report would present details on such things as patents, oil reserves, and information technology—all in a standardized form, rather than the haphazard disclosures already made by some public companies—to facilitate comparison of issuers within an industry.
Lev and Gu seek, above all, to improve on GAAP’s measurement of value creation by focusing the proposed report on cash flows. In their system, companies would not only capitalize R&D but would also provide a breakdown separating research (i.e., the systematic pursuit of new knowledge) and development (i.e., the use of research to develop new products or processes). Additionally, a charge for the cost of equity capital would be deducted from cash flows. Where feasible, changes in values of major strategic assets, such as the present value of cash flows from proven oil and gas reserves, would be taken into account.
The authors recognize and deal effectively with objections to their innovations. These objections include an increased reporting burden (which they suggest might be partly offset by dispensing with quarterly reporting in favor of semiannual statements) and companies’ predictable complaint that they would be forced to divulge proprietary information to competitors. Lev and Gu prefer to have their reforms come about through demand from investors rather than by government fiat, although they would welcome the US SEC’s support of their project.
Lev and Gu differentiate their remedies from others that have been proposed, such as “key performance indicators” and the “triple bottom line,” which tracks management’s impact on people and the planet as well as on profits. Their reconstruction of financial statements does, however, bear some similarity to economic value added (EVA).1 Both approaches take into account the cost of equity capital, although Lev and Gu’s starting point is cash flows whereas EVA’s is earnings.
The End of Accounting makes a powerful case for redirecting security analysis away from GAAP accounting. Already, the authors note, between 2003 and 2013, the proportion of public companies reporting non-GAAP (“pro forma”) earnings doubled from 20% to 40%. How can this phenomenon be explained, they ask, other than as a function of company managers’ awareness of the rapidly diminishing usefulness of financial information to investors? Actually, there is an alternative narrative—namely, that corporate executives benefit when their bonuses are calculated on the basis of non-GAAP rather than (lower) GAAP earnings
17 agosto 2016
Links
Os mapas mentem (vídeo)
Homens são mais propensos a fazerem citação dos seus trabalhos em pesquisas científicas
Razões para os adultos terem dificuldades em aprender uma segunda língua
Como corrigir o problema de reversão a média
Slate: Ele rouba, mas faz - analisando a trajetória de Maluf
Links
Os mapas mentem (vídeo)
Homens são mais propensos a fazerem citação dos seus trabalhos em pesquisas científicas
Razões para os adultos terem dificuldades em aprender uma segunda língua
Como corrigir o problema de reversão a média
Slate: Ele rouba, mas faz - analisando a trajetória de Maluf
Prejuízo e dividendo
A empresa de mineração BHP anunciou o pior prejuízo anual de sua história: 6,4 bilhões de dólares (Hoyle, Rhiannon. BHP tem perda histórica devido a preços e baixa contábil. Valor Econômico, 17 ago 2016). Entre os motivos que justificam o desempenho: redução no preço das matérias-primas, demissão de funcionários e fechamento de minas (que justificam as amortizações contábeis de 7,7 bilhões), desastres ambientais (Mariana e Samarco, com reflexo de 2,2 bilhões de dólares), problemas com a divisão de petróleo (4,9 bilhões de efeito no resultado), entre outros aspectos.A empresa "afirmou que a oferta abundante de petróleo e de metais como o cobre deve persistir". E que a economia da China vai estabilizar, mas não se recuperar. Além disto, não deverá fazer investimentos em novos projetos ou reduzir o ritmo.
Apesar de todo este cenário, inclusive de prejuízo, a empresa manteve o pagamento dos dividendos. Contraditório, mas duas possíveis explicações: o otimismo administrativo ou a sinalização de que a situação da empresa não é tão ruim.
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