06 agosto 2014
Como o governo prolongou a depressão?
How Government Prolonged the Depression
Policies that decreased competition in product and labor markets were especially destructive.
Harold L. Cole and
Lee E. Ohanian
The Wall Street journal, February 2, 2009
The New Deal is widely perceived to have ended the Great Depression, and this has led many to support a "new" New Deal to address the current crisis. But the facts do not support the perception that FDR's policies shortened the Depression, or that similar policies will pull our nation out of its current economic downturn.
A man selling apples during the Great Depression. Corbis
The goal of the New Deal was to get Americans back to work. But the New Deal didn't restore employment. In fact, there was even less work on average during the New Deal than before FDR took office. Total hours worked per adult, including government employees, were 18% below their 1929 level between 1930-32, but were 23% lower on average during the New Deal (1933-39). Private hours worked were even lower after FDR took office, averaging 27% below their 1929 level, compared to 18% lower between in 1930-32.
Even comparing hours worked at the end of 1930s to those at the beginning of FDR's presidency doesn't paint a picture of recovery. Total hours worked per adult in 1939 remained about 21% below their 1929 level, compared to a decline of 27% in 1933. And it wasn't just work that remained scarce during the New Deal. Per capita consumption did not recover at all, remaining 25% below its trend level throughout the New Deal, and per-capita nonresidential investment averaged about 60% below trend. The Great Depression clearly continued long after FDR took office.
Why wasn't the Depression followed by a vigorous recovery, like every other cycle? It should have been. The economic fundamentals that drive all expansions were very favorable during the New Deal. Productivity grew very rapidly after 1933, the price level was stable, real interest rates were low, and liquidity was plentiful. We have calculated on the basis of just productivity growth that employment and investment should have been back to normal levels by 1936. Similarly, Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas and Leonard Rapping calculated on the basis of just expansionary Federal Reserve policy that the economy should have been back to normal by 1935.
So what stopped a blockbuster recovery from ever starting? The New Deal. Some New Deal policies certainly benefited the economy by establishing a basic social safety net through Social Security and unemployment benefits, and by stabilizing the financial system through deposit insurance and the Securities Exchange Commission. But others violated the most basic economic principles by suppressing competition, and setting prices and wages in many sectors well above their normal levels. All told, these antimarket policies choked off powerful recovery forces that would have plausibly returned the economy back to trend by the mid-1930s.
The most damaging policies were those at the heart of the recovery plan, including The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which tossed aside the nation's antitrust acts and permitted industries to collusively raise prices provided that they shared their newfound monopoly rents with workers by substantially raising wages well above underlying productivity growth. The NIRA covered over 500 industries, ranging from autos and steel, to ladies hosiery and poultry production. Each industry created a code of "fair competition" which spelled out what producers could and could not do, and which were designed to eliminate "excessive competition" that FDR believed to be the source of the Depression.
These codes distorted the economy by artificially raising wages and prices, restricting output, and reducing productive capacity by placing quotas on industry investment in new plants and equipment. Following government approval of each industry code, industry prices and wages increased substantially, while prices and wages in sectors that weren't covered by the NIRA, such as agriculture, did not. We have calculated that manufacturing wages were as much as 25% above the level that would have prevailed without the New Deal. And while the artificially high wages created by the NIRA benefited the few that were fortunate to have a job in those industries, they significantly depressed production and employment, as the growth in wage costs far exceeded productivity growth.
These policies continued even after the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935. There was no antitrust activity after the NIRA, despite overwhelming FTC evidence of price-fixing and production limits in many industries, and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 gave unions substantial collective-bargaining power. While not permitted under federal law, the sit-down strike, in which workers were occupied factories and shut down production, was tolerated by governors in a number of states and was used with great success against major employers, including General Motors in 1937.
The downturn of 1937-38 was preceded by large wage hikes that pushed wages well above their NIRA levels, following the Supreme Court's 1937 decision that upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act. These wage hikes led to further job loss, particularly in manufacturing. The "recession in a depression" thus was not the result of a reversal of New Deal policies, as argued by some, but rather a deepening of New Deal polices that raised wages even further above their competitive levels, and which further prevented the normal forces of supply and demand from restoring full employment. Our research indicates that New Deal labor and industrial policies prolonged the Depression by seven years.
By the late 1930s, New Deal policies did begin to reverse, which coincided with the beginning of the recovery. In a 1938 speech, FDR acknowledged that the American economy had become a "concealed cartel system like Europe," which led the Justice Department to reinitiate antitrust prosecution. And union bargaining power was significantly reduced, first by the Supreme Court's ruling that the sit-down strike was illegal, and further reduced during World War II by the National War Labor Board (NWLB), in which large union wage settlements were limited by the NWLB to cost-of-living increases. The wartime economic boom reflected not only the enormous resource drain of military spending, but also the erosion of New Deal labor and industrial policies.
By 1947, through a combination of NWLB wage restrictions and rapid productivity growth, we have calculated that the large gap between manufacturing wages and productivity that emerged during the New Deal had nearly been eliminated. And since that time, wages have never approached the severely distorted levels that prevailed under the New Deal, nor has the country suffered from such abysmally low employment.
The main lesson we have learned from the New Deal is that wholesale government intervention can -- and does -- deliver the most unintended of consequences. This was true in the 1930s, when artificially high wages and prices kept us depressed for more than a decade, it was true in the 1970s when price controls were used to combat inflation but just produced shortages. It is true today, when poorly designed regulation produced a banking system that took on too much risk.
President Barack Obama and Congress have a great opportunity to produce reforms that do return Americans to work, and that provide a foundation for sustained long-run economic growth and the opportunity for all Americans to succeed. These reforms should include very specific plans that update banking regulations and address a manufacturing sector in which several large industries -- including autos and steel -- are no longer internationally competitive. Tax reform that broadens rather than narrows the tax base and that increases incentives to work, save and invest is also needed. We must also confront an educational system that fails many of its constituents. A large fiscal stimulus plan that doesn't directly address the specific impediments that our economy faces is unlikely to achieve either the country's short-term or long-term goals.
Mr. Cole is professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Ohanian is professor of economics and director of the Ettinger Family Program in Macroeconomic Research at UCLA.
Policies that decreased competition in product and labor markets were especially destructive.
Harold L. Cole and
Lee E. Ohanian
The Wall Street journal, February 2, 2009
The New Deal is widely perceived to have ended the Great Depression, and this has led many to support a "new" New Deal to address the current crisis. But the facts do not support the perception that FDR's policies shortened the Depression, or that similar policies will pull our nation out of its current economic downturn.
A man selling apples during the Great Depression. Corbis
The goal of the New Deal was to get Americans back to work. But the New Deal didn't restore employment. In fact, there was even less work on average during the New Deal than before FDR took office. Total hours worked per adult, including government employees, were 18% below their 1929 level between 1930-32, but were 23% lower on average during the New Deal (1933-39). Private hours worked were even lower after FDR took office, averaging 27% below their 1929 level, compared to 18% lower between in 1930-32.
Even comparing hours worked at the end of 1930s to those at the beginning of FDR's presidency doesn't paint a picture of recovery. Total hours worked per adult in 1939 remained about 21% below their 1929 level, compared to a decline of 27% in 1933. And it wasn't just work that remained scarce during the New Deal. Per capita consumption did not recover at all, remaining 25% below its trend level throughout the New Deal, and per-capita nonresidential investment averaged about 60% below trend. The Great Depression clearly continued long after FDR took office.
Why wasn't the Depression followed by a vigorous recovery, like every other cycle? It should have been. The economic fundamentals that drive all expansions were very favorable during the New Deal. Productivity grew very rapidly after 1933, the price level was stable, real interest rates were low, and liquidity was plentiful. We have calculated on the basis of just productivity growth that employment and investment should have been back to normal levels by 1936. Similarly, Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas and Leonard Rapping calculated on the basis of just expansionary Federal Reserve policy that the economy should have been back to normal by 1935.
So what stopped a blockbuster recovery from ever starting? The New Deal. Some New Deal policies certainly benefited the economy by establishing a basic social safety net through Social Security and unemployment benefits, and by stabilizing the financial system through deposit insurance and the Securities Exchange Commission. But others violated the most basic economic principles by suppressing competition, and setting prices and wages in many sectors well above their normal levels. All told, these antimarket policies choked off powerful recovery forces that would have plausibly returned the economy back to trend by the mid-1930s.
The most damaging policies were those at the heart of the recovery plan, including The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which tossed aside the nation's antitrust acts and permitted industries to collusively raise prices provided that they shared their newfound monopoly rents with workers by substantially raising wages well above underlying productivity growth. The NIRA covered over 500 industries, ranging from autos and steel, to ladies hosiery and poultry production. Each industry created a code of "fair competition" which spelled out what producers could and could not do, and which were designed to eliminate "excessive competition" that FDR believed to be the source of the Depression.
These codes distorted the economy by artificially raising wages and prices, restricting output, and reducing productive capacity by placing quotas on industry investment in new plants and equipment. Following government approval of each industry code, industry prices and wages increased substantially, while prices and wages in sectors that weren't covered by the NIRA, such as agriculture, did not. We have calculated that manufacturing wages were as much as 25% above the level that would have prevailed without the New Deal. And while the artificially high wages created by the NIRA benefited the few that were fortunate to have a job in those industries, they significantly depressed production and employment, as the growth in wage costs far exceeded productivity growth.
These policies continued even after the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935. There was no antitrust activity after the NIRA, despite overwhelming FTC evidence of price-fixing and production limits in many industries, and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 gave unions substantial collective-bargaining power. While not permitted under federal law, the sit-down strike, in which workers were occupied factories and shut down production, was tolerated by governors in a number of states and was used with great success against major employers, including General Motors in 1937.
The downturn of 1937-38 was preceded by large wage hikes that pushed wages well above their NIRA levels, following the Supreme Court's 1937 decision that upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act. These wage hikes led to further job loss, particularly in manufacturing. The "recession in a depression" thus was not the result of a reversal of New Deal policies, as argued by some, but rather a deepening of New Deal polices that raised wages even further above their competitive levels, and which further prevented the normal forces of supply and demand from restoring full employment. Our research indicates that New Deal labor and industrial policies prolonged the Depression by seven years.
By the late 1930s, New Deal policies did begin to reverse, which coincided with the beginning of the recovery. In a 1938 speech, FDR acknowledged that the American economy had become a "concealed cartel system like Europe," which led the Justice Department to reinitiate antitrust prosecution. And union bargaining power was significantly reduced, first by the Supreme Court's ruling that the sit-down strike was illegal, and further reduced during World War II by the National War Labor Board (NWLB), in which large union wage settlements were limited by the NWLB to cost-of-living increases. The wartime economic boom reflected not only the enormous resource drain of military spending, but also the erosion of New Deal labor and industrial policies.
By 1947, through a combination of NWLB wage restrictions and rapid productivity growth, we have calculated that the large gap between manufacturing wages and productivity that emerged during the New Deal had nearly been eliminated. And since that time, wages have never approached the severely distorted levels that prevailed under the New Deal, nor has the country suffered from such abysmally low employment.
The main lesson we have learned from the New Deal is that wholesale government intervention can -- and does -- deliver the most unintended of consequences. This was true in the 1930s, when artificially high wages and prices kept us depressed for more than a decade, it was true in the 1970s when price controls were used to combat inflation but just produced shortages. It is true today, when poorly designed regulation produced a banking system that took on too much risk.
President Barack Obama and Congress have a great opportunity to produce reforms that do return Americans to work, and that provide a foundation for sustained long-run economic growth and the opportunity for all Americans to succeed. These reforms should include very specific plans that update banking regulations and address a manufacturing sector in which several large industries -- including autos and steel -- are no longer internationally competitive. Tax reform that broadens rather than narrows the tax base and that increases incentives to work, save and invest is also needed. We must also confront an educational system that fails many of its constituents. A large fiscal stimulus plan that doesn't directly address the specific impediments that our economy faces is unlikely to achieve either the country's short-term or long-term goals.
Mr. Cole is professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Ohanian is professor of economics and director of the Ettinger Family Program in Macroeconomic Research at UCLA.
Curso de Contabilidade Básica: Depósitos Judiciais
Muitas vezes a empresa é obrigada a fazer um depósito numa conta bancária referente a um processo que está tramitando na justiça. Se a empresa perder o processo, o valor do depósito fica com a outra parte; se ganhar, a empresa poderá usar os montantes que estão numa instituição financeira. Caso a empresa acredite no sucesso da causa, os valores podem ser considerados como um ativo.
Para discutir sobre estes depósitos tomamos o balanço patrimonial da empresa Grazziotin, que atua na região Sul no comércio varejista. Esta empresa apresentou o seguinte balanço patrimonial da controladora:
Além dos depósitos Judiciais destaquei também dois outros aspectos: primeiro, a empresa, assim como muitas outras, ainda chama o lado direito de “passivo”. Segundo, a empresa denomina seu patrimônio líquido de “investimentos”.
Quanto aos depósitos judiciais, o valor era de 19 milhões no final do primeiro trimestre de 2013 e de 23,3 milhões no final de março de 2014. Mas no primeiro período este item era considerado como uma conta negativa do passivo não circulante e no segundo como uma conta positiva do realizável a longo prazo (com o nome de “depositos judicias”). O que ocorreu entre os dois períodos? Segundo a empresa este item foi reclassificado em 2014 para atender a uma norma contábil, no caso o CPC 26, que determina que estes valores sejam considerados como parte do ativo. Ou seja, o valor negativo no passivo foi realocado para ficar, com o saldo positivo, no ativo.
Aparentemente esta classificação não afeta o resultado. Mas não é bem assim. Um das informações mais relevantes de uma empresa é o endividamento. Considere a relação entre o passivo e o total do ativo. Se em 31 de março de 2013 este valor estivesse no ativo (e não no passivo como apresentado pela empresa), o endividamento seria de 25,9%, e não 22,6% como estão no balanço apresentado. Ou seja, a classificação inadequada dos depósitos judiciais traz uma diferença de 3,3% no endividamento da empresa.
Para discutir sobre estes depósitos tomamos o balanço patrimonial da empresa Grazziotin, que atua na região Sul no comércio varejista. Esta empresa apresentou o seguinte balanço patrimonial da controladora:
Além dos depósitos Judiciais destaquei também dois outros aspectos: primeiro, a empresa, assim como muitas outras, ainda chama o lado direito de “passivo”. Segundo, a empresa denomina seu patrimônio líquido de “investimentos”.
Quanto aos depósitos judiciais, o valor era de 19 milhões no final do primeiro trimestre de 2013 e de 23,3 milhões no final de março de 2014. Mas no primeiro período este item era considerado como uma conta negativa do passivo não circulante e no segundo como uma conta positiva do realizável a longo prazo (com o nome de “depositos judicias”). O que ocorreu entre os dois períodos? Segundo a empresa este item foi reclassificado em 2014 para atender a uma norma contábil, no caso o CPC 26, que determina que estes valores sejam considerados como parte do ativo. Ou seja, o valor negativo no passivo foi realocado para ficar, com o saldo positivo, no ativo.
Aparentemente esta classificação não afeta o resultado. Mas não é bem assim. Um das informações mais relevantes de uma empresa é o endividamento. Considere a relação entre o passivo e o total do ativo. Se em 31 de março de 2013 este valor estivesse no ativo (e não no passivo como apresentado pela empresa), o endividamento seria de 25,9%, e não 22,6% como estão no balanço apresentado. Ou seja, a classificação inadequada dos depósitos judiciais traz uma diferença de 3,3% no endividamento da empresa.
Curso de Contabilidade Básica - Editora Atlas - César Augusto Tibúrcio
Silva e Fernanda Fernandes Rodrigues (prelo)
Mercado de Trabalho no Brasil
O comportamento do mercado de trabalho no Brasil é um tema que merece uma maior reflexão da sociedade, notadamente sob os aspectos econômicos e políticos. A economia brasileira passa por um quadro inusitado, com taxas de crescimento da economia (PIB) muito baixas nos últimos anos, e um mercado de trabalho próximo do pleno emprego. Esse contexto instigante, quase paradoxal, indica que é preciso analisar e explicar melhor o que está ocorrendo nesse importante mercado.
Os grandes números do mercado de trabalho no País, medidos pelo IBGE, revelam que um contingente de 91,2 milhões de pessoas tinha alguma ocupação no primeiro trimestre de 2014, contra os 91,8 milhões verificados no trimestre imediatamente anterior. Por sua vez, o número de brasileiros desocupados passou de 6,1 milhões para 7,0 milhões entre o quarto trimestre de 2013 e o primeiro de 2014. Na comparação com o último trimestre de 2013, houve aumento na taxa de desemprego em todas as regiões.
Deve-se destacar, nesta análise, que a elevação da população não economicamente ativa tende a ocorrer, em geral, pela postergação da entrada no mercado de trabalho dos jovens, fruto do crescimento da renda familiar, e a um fator conjuntural, em decorrência da disseminação de informações pessimistas da economia. Assim, em um cenário de redução de crescimento da economia, a difusão de informação de que empresas não estão admitindo faz com que as pessoas se retraiam naturalmente, deixem de procurar empregos. Para agravar esse cenário, registre-se que existe um contingente significativo de jovens brasileiros que não estudam e nem trabalham, contribuindo para elevar o tamanho da população não economicamente ativa.
Para uma melhor compreensão do que está ocorrendo no mercado de trabalho, diante de sua complexidade, é necessário levar em consideração, também, o tempo que o trabalhador permanece na fila do desemprego. Nesse sentido, merecem destaque os dados que mostram um preocupante aumento do contingente dos que estão buscando um novo emprego há mais de um ano, que se aproximam de 18%. Esse dado evidencia que os efeitos decorrentes do baixo desempenho da economia brasileira estão chegando ao mercado de trabalho, dando início a um inquietante processo de deterioração nesse mercado.
Pode-se concluir, assim, que as taxas baixas de desemprego no Brasil deverão iniciar nos próximos meses um processo de deterioração, em função das perspectivas desfavoráveis no desempenho da economia brasileira. Assim, é preciso alertar que o cenário do mercado de trabalho no Brasil merece mais atenção do que comemoração.
O agravamento do mercado de trabalho no Brasil - José Matias-Pereira
*José Matias-Pereira é professor de administração pública e pesquisador associado do programa de pós-graduação em contabilidade da Universidade de Brasília (UNB)
Os grandes números do mercado de trabalho no País, medidos pelo IBGE, revelam que um contingente de 91,2 milhões de pessoas tinha alguma ocupação no primeiro trimestre de 2014, contra os 91,8 milhões verificados no trimestre imediatamente anterior. Por sua vez, o número de brasileiros desocupados passou de 6,1 milhões para 7,0 milhões entre o quarto trimestre de 2013 e o primeiro de 2014. Na comparação com o último trimestre de 2013, houve aumento na taxa de desemprego em todas as regiões.
Deve-se destacar, nesta análise, que a elevação da população não economicamente ativa tende a ocorrer, em geral, pela postergação da entrada no mercado de trabalho dos jovens, fruto do crescimento da renda familiar, e a um fator conjuntural, em decorrência da disseminação de informações pessimistas da economia. Assim, em um cenário de redução de crescimento da economia, a difusão de informação de que empresas não estão admitindo faz com que as pessoas se retraiam naturalmente, deixem de procurar empregos. Para agravar esse cenário, registre-se que existe um contingente significativo de jovens brasileiros que não estudam e nem trabalham, contribuindo para elevar o tamanho da população não economicamente ativa.
Para uma melhor compreensão do que está ocorrendo no mercado de trabalho, diante de sua complexidade, é necessário levar em consideração, também, o tempo que o trabalhador permanece na fila do desemprego. Nesse sentido, merecem destaque os dados que mostram um preocupante aumento do contingente dos que estão buscando um novo emprego há mais de um ano, que se aproximam de 18%. Esse dado evidencia que os efeitos decorrentes do baixo desempenho da economia brasileira estão chegando ao mercado de trabalho, dando início a um inquietante processo de deterioração nesse mercado.
Pode-se concluir, assim, que as taxas baixas de desemprego no Brasil deverão iniciar nos próximos meses um processo de deterioração, em função das perspectivas desfavoráveis no desempenho da economia brasileira. Assim, é preciso alertar que o cenário do mercado de trabalho no Brasil merece mais atenção do que comemoração.
O agravamento do mercado de trabalho no Brasil - José Matias-Pereira
*José Matias-Pereira é professor de administração pública e pesquisador associado do programa de pós-graduação em contabilidade da Universidade de Brasília (UNB)
Resenha: Guia Politicamente Incorreto do Futebol
Este é mais um livro da série “Guia Politicamente Incorreto (...)” da editora Leya. Esta coleção fez sucesso com outros temas e a fórmula tenta captar a atenção do leitor interessado em futebol. Mais de 400 páginas e 18 capítulos, o texto trata de assuntos diversos como racismo, seleção de setenta, batalha dos Aflitos, Barcelona, Pelé e Maradona.
Como o próprio título induz, algumas das posições dos autores são polêmicas, como é a afirmação de que “Messi não é um bom garoto” (último capítulo). O problema é que o livro, escrito por jornalistas, cai na “faláciado jornalista”. Esta falácia acontece quando se toma um ou dois depoimentos e fazem conclusões apressadas. No caso do Messi, o livro usa três acontecimentos para fazer esta conclusão.
Outros pontos levantados, como o “futebol não é um bom negócio”, já mereceu uma análise muito mais interessante e profunda no Soccernomics, por exemplo. Para quem já leu Soccernomics, o texto deste Guia é mais superficial.
Mas é inegável que a leitura do livro é agradável. O formato ajuda e os capítulos podem ser lidos de maneira independente. Neste sentido, os problemas apontados anteriormente não prejudicam a leitura.
Vale a pena? Para quem gosta de futebol, inclusive discutir futebol, é interessante sua leitura. Pode acrescentar polêmica nas conversas com os amigos.
ROSSI, Jones; MENDES JR, Leonardo. Guia Politicamente Incorreto do Futebol
. Leya, 2014.
. Leya, 2014.
Americanas
Submarino
ShopTime
SouBarato.com.br-
Pelo voto facultativo
Entre los 10 países más ricos del planeta, en todos, menos en Brasil, ir a las urnas ha dejado de ser obligatorio o nunca lo ha sido.
Hoy el voto facultativo está vigente en 205 países del mundo y solo en 24 de ellos (13 en América Latina) sigue siendo obligatorio.
¿Habría que deducir de ello que esos países, empezando por Brasil, no son ni modernos ni cuentan aún con una democracia consolidada? Quizás no, pero según no pocos analistas políticos, de llevarse a cabo la tan anunciada y nunca realizada reforma política, debería empezar por admitir el voto facultativo, ya que una de las características de una democracia real y no solo virtual es que proteja los mayores espacios de libertad de los ciudadanos.
¿Es posible que un derecho se convierta en un deber? ¿Que alguien pueda ser castigado con sanciones en una democracia por no querer ejercer un derecho?
No ha sido probado que el voto obligatorio mejore las democracias del mundo ni que aumente la participación ciudadana en las elecciones
El derecho del voto extendido a todos los ciudadanos, varones o mujeres, ilustrados o analfabetos, fue una de las mayores conquistas de las democracias liberales. Todos, sin distinción de sexo o posición social, tienen el derecho a poder participar en la vida polìtica a través del voto que permite elegir a los representantes de la vida pública.
Ello no significa, sin embargo, que deba ser obligatorio ni merecedor de castigos el dejar de hacer uso de dicho derecho. Sobre todo porque no ha sido probado que el voto obligatorio mejore las democracias del mundo ni que aumente en ellas la participación ciudadana en las elecciones.
La mayor o menor participación depende sobre todo del interés o desinterés que los ciudadanos demuestren frente a cada elección. Incluso el voto llamado “anti-política” (como, por ejemplo, el nulo o en blanco), no significa un voto contra la democracia o contra la legítima Constitución del país. Puede indicar, sencillamente, una forma de descontento con el modo de gobernar de los políticos elegidos democraticamente, o sencillamente la voluntad de dar paso a nuevas formas de democracia más modernas y más adaptadas a los nuevos instrumentos de comunicación global que hoy ofrece la tecnología.
Manifestarse en contra de la obligatoriedad del voto tampoco significa que los que están en contra de dicha obligatoriedad vayan a dejar de votar , sino simplemente que prefieren, en aras de la democracia, que cada uno sea libre de participar o no.
Si Brasil, séptima potencia económica del mundo, con una democracia reconocida por todos donde existe la separación de los tres poderes, sigue entre los 24 países que aún obligan a votar, significa, como mínimo, una clara anomalía democrática.
La ultima vez que la encuesta Datafolha, hace cuatro años, publicó los índices de brasileños que preferirían que el voto fuera facultativo, quedó claro que la gran mayoría (64%) preferían que el voto no fuera obligatorio. Y entre ese 64% figuraban sobre todo los más instruidos y los jóvenes.
¿No bastaría ese índice, que seguramente hoy sería aún mayor, para que se incluyera en la reforma política la libertad de votar?
Por si fuera poco, otro sondeo indicó que el 30% de los votantes ya había olvidado el nombre del candidato votado a los 20 días de ir a las urnas. ¿Será ese el fruto de la obligatoriedad del voto?
Como ha escrito Nicolás Ocarazán: “El voto obligatorio es una manera desesperada para intentar que los apáticos vayan a las urnas. Pero si la política es incapaz de seducirles por la vía de las ideas para qué obligarles a participar a un sistema incapaz de ser representativo y participativo?”.
La resistencia de los políticos brasileños al voto facultativo, en contra de la gran mayoría de los países del mundo, podría llevar a pensar que más que de la defensa de un derecho se trate de intereses inconfesables que poco tienen que ver con la defensa de los valores de la verdadera democracia.
Juan Arias - El Pais (grifo nosso)
Listas: As Melhores Universidades em Business
As melhores universidades na área de negócios, com o custo:10 – Darmouth College – 94 mil US$
9 – London Business School – 110 mil
8 - London School of Economics and Political Science – 80 mil
7 - Northwestern University – 89 mil
6 - Columbia University – 96 mil
5 - University of Chicago – 95 mil
4 - Massachusetts Institute of Technology - 93 mil
3 - University of Pennsylvania (The Wharton School) – 98 mil
2 - Stanford University – 99 mil
1 - Harvard University - 95 mil (foto)
É interessante notar que a Universidade do Texas, de Austin, considerada a melhor na área contábil, ficou em 24º. Lugar.
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