A questão do desemprego no setor contábil continua grave. Segundo os dados do Ministério de Trabalho, tendo por base as informações do emprego formal, em outubro o número de demitidos superou aqueles que conseguiram uma vaga em 972. Já são doze meses que isto ocorre; considerando o valor acumulado, de janeiro de 2014 até o mês passado, foram 26,7 mil vagas reduzidas no Brasil.
O salário médio dos demitidos era de R$430 a mais do que os admitidos, o que corresponde a 19%. Esta distância foi de 25% no mês passado. Mas o tempo médio de emprego daqueles que foram mandados embora aumentou para 36 meses. Também, a exemplo dos meses anteriores, a idade média dos admitidos é menor que dos demitidos: 30,13 anos versus 32,51 anos.
A questão do desemprego atinge principalmente as mulheres, que representam a grande maioria da mão-de-obra contratada na área contábil no Brasil. Em outubro o saldo de admissão menos demissão para as mulheres foi de 713, um pouco acima de 73% do total. O problema tem atingido os empregados com curso médio completo e os escriturários.
A grande maioria das demissões foi sem justa causa. Em outubro representou 77% do total, um número um pouco acima da média dos meses anteriores.
24 novembro 2016
Auditor punido
A CVM julgou dois casos envolvendo auditoria. No primeiro, puniu a Exacto por não observar as normas do Conselho Federal de Contabilidade e não elaborar relatório sobre os controles internos da Construtora Sultepa.
O segundo caso a punição decorreu da não observância do rodízio dos auditores. A Habitasul tinha como auditor a empresa de auditoria Nardon Nasi. A partir de 2004 passou a ser auditada pela RBA, que tinha o mesmo responsável técnico, Antônio Carlos Nasi. (Este, por sua vez, foi/é um nome de destaque do CFC e detentor da medalha João Lyra).
O segundo caso a punição decorreu da não observância do rodízio dos auditores. A Habitasul tinha como auditor a empresa de auditoria Nardon Nasi. A partir de 2004 passou a ser auditada pela RBA, que tinha o mesmo responsável técnico, Antônio Carlos Nasi. (Este, por sua vez, foi/é um nome de destaque do CFC e detentor da medalha João Lyra).
Estresse Ocupacional nos escritórios contábeis
O estudo procurou investigar a percepção dos empresários e funcionários de escritórios de contabilidade quanto à influência do estresse ocupacional na preparação das demonstrações contábeis (...) Os resultados apresentaram indícios dos empresários terem a percepção de que o mau humor e a escassez de tempo seriam fatores que afetariam a preparação das demonstrações contábeis. Já os funcionários apresentam a percepção de que a escassez de tempo seria o aspecto, entre os avaliados, que mais influenciaria o preparo das demonstrações. Desse modo, os resultados alcançados no estudo sinalizam que as percepções dos funcionários e empresários são distintas e uma das possíveis explicações para o comportamento observado pode estar relacionado às posições antagônicas de empresários e funcionários, naturalmente decorrente do conflito de interesses quanto aos fatores de produção: capital e trabalho.
(SILVA, Maria Daniella de O. P. da; LOPES, Christianne C. V. de M; SILVA, José D. G. da. Estresse ocupacional na preparação das demonstrações contábeis. RBC, 221, 2016)
(SILVA, Maria Daniella de O. P. da; LOPES, Christianne C. V. de M; SILVA, José D. G. da. Estresse ocupacional na preparação das demonstrações contábeis. RBC, 221, 2016)
Estrutura de custo
O Banco do Brasil apresentou uma proposta de redução de custos através de várias medidas. A mais relevante delas é um programa de aposentadoria antecipada, que pretende retirar da instituição 18 mil funcionários de um total de 109 mil. Os números são significativos:
Segundo as projeções do BB, a economia poderá chegar a R$3,048 bilhões por ano (…) o custo do programa para o BB seria de R$2,7 bilhões. (RIBEIRO, Alex. Economia annual da instituição deve ficar em R$3 bi, Valor 22 de novembro de 2016, p. c1)
A ação subiu de 26.1 para 27.82 assim que a notícia foi anunciada. O mercado acreditou que isto poderia aumentar o lucro no médio e o longo prazo.
Um aspecto importante é que funcionário de um banco é fonte de captação receita. É verdade que se o quadro de funcionários está inchado é possível demitir sem efeito expressivo na geração de receita. Além disto, como há uma forte migração do atendimento pessoal para o online, isto pode levar a uma redução no quadro sem efeitos relevantes na receita.
Talvez o aspecto mais relevante é saber que a gestão do Banco do Brasil está tomando medidas para melhor a geração de resultado. Isto, por si só, pode justificar a mudança no patamar de preços das ações ocorrida nos últimos dias. (Ah, sim, tem uma pegadinha no título do texto citado: 3 bilhões é o valor do salário que deixará de ser pago; mas para isto, o programa de demissão terá um custo de 2,7 bilhões)
Segundo as projeções do BB, a economia poderá chegar a R$3,048 bilhões por ano (…) o custo do programa para o BB seria de R$2,7 bilhões. (RIBEIRO, Alex. Economia annual da instituição deve ficar em R$3 bi, Valor 22 de novembro de 2016, p. c1)
A ação subiu de 26.1 para 27.82 assim que a notícia foi anunciada. O mercado acreditou que isto poderia aumentar o lucro no médio e o longo prazo.
Um aspecto importante é que funcionário de um banco é fonte de captação receita. É verdade que se o quadro de funcionários está inchado é possível demitir sem efeito expressivo na geração de receita. Além disto, como há uma forte migração do atendimento pessoal para o online, isto pode levar a uma redução no quadro sem efeitos relevantes na receita.
Talvez o aspecto mais relevante é saber que a gestão do Banco do Brasil está tomando medidas para melhor a geração de resultado. Isto, por si só, pode justificar a mudança no patamar de preços das ações ocorrida nos últimos dias. (Ah, sim, tem uma pegadinha no título do texto citado: 3 bilhões é o valor do salário que deixará de ser pago; mas para isto, o programa de demissão terá um custo de 2,7 bilhões)
Pseudo-Matemática e o charlatanismo em Finanças
O paper abaixo explora o problema do sobreajustamento de dados históricos no teste de estratégias de investimento. Eles mostram que o backtesting usados pelas gestoras de ativos não tem rigor estatístico. Aliás, grande parte do conteudo sobre finanças ensinada nas universidades sobre temas de finanças está completamente errada e não tem rigor.
Resumo:
We prove that high simulated performance is easily achievable after backtesting a relatively small number of alternative strategy configurations, a practice we denote “backtest overfitting”. The higher the number of configurations tried, the greater is the probability that the backtest is overfit. Because most financial analysts and academics rarely report the number of configurations tried for a given backtest, investors cannot evaluate the degree of overfitting in most investment proposals.
The implication is that investors can be easily misled into allocating capital to strategies that appear to be mathematically sound and empirically supported by an outstanding backtest. Under memory effects, backtest overfitting leads to negative expected returns out-of-sample, rather than zero performance. This may be one of several reasons why so many quantitative funds appear to fail.
[...]
The authors’ argument is that, by failing to apply mathematical rigour to their methods, many purveyors of quantitative investment strategies are, deliberately or negligently, misleading clients.
It is reasonable to want to test a promising investment strategy to see how it would have performed in the past. The trap comes when one keeps tweaking the strategy until it neatly fits the historical data. Intuitively, one might think one has finally hit upon the most successful investment strategy; in fact, one is likely to have hit only upon a statistical fluke, a false positive.
This is the problem of “over-fitting”, and even checks against it – such as testing in a second, discrete historical data set – will continue to throw up many false positives, the mathematicians argue.
Do not despair. The paper does not conclude that history is bunk, just that backtesting ought to require more statistical thought than investment managers need to display to make a sale to investors.
Resumo:
We prove that high simulated performance is easily achievable after backtesting a relatively small number of alternative strategy configurations, a practice we denote “backtest overfitting”. The higher the number of configurations tried, the greater is the probability that the backtest is overfit. Because most financial analysts and academics rarely report the number of configurations tried for a given backtest, investors cannot evaluate the degree of overfitting in most investment proposals.
The implication is that investors can be easily misled into allocating capital to strategies that appear to be mathematically sound and empirically supported by an outstanding backtest. Under memory effects, backtest overfitting leads to negative expected returns out-of-sample, rather than zero performance. This may be one of several reasons why so many quantitative funds appear to fail.
The authors’ argument is that, by failing to apply mathematical rigour to their methods, many purveyors of quantitative investment strategies are, deliberately or negligently, misleading clients.
It is reasonable to want to test a promising investment strategy to see how it would have performed in the past. The trap comes when one keeps tweaking the strategy until it neatly fits the historical data. Intuitively, one might think one has finally hit upon the most successful investment strategy; in fact, one is likely to have hit only upon a statistical fluke, a false positive.
This is the problem of “over-fitting”, and even checks against it – such as testing in a second, discrete historical data set – will continue to throw up many false positives, the mathematicians argue.
Do not despair. The paper does not conclude that history is bunk, just that backtesting ought to require more statistical thought than investment managers need to display to make a sale to investors.
[...]
Governança corporativa em mercados emergentes
Dois economistas do FMI propuseram uma nova forma de avaliar a governança corporativa em mercados emergentes (um resumo pode ser encontrado aqui). Segundo o estudo, a governança corporativa tem-se fortalecido nos últimos anos, especialmente na Ásia e em outras economias. Na América Latina a melhoria é pouco expressiva, conforme a figura a seguir:
Uma conclusão interessante é que as empresas com melhores níveis de governança são mais resistentes em situações de crise. No primeiro gráfico abaixo, durante a crise financeira global, as empresas com melhores níveis (acima de 2/3 da pontuação) sofreram menos. No segundo, com a decisão da Inglaterra de sair da comunidade européia, novamente ocorreu a mesma situação.
Recado do papa aos contadores
[...]
Pope Francis has urged accountants to combat financial corruption. “In your work, you accountants support businesses, but also single families, by offering your economic and financial advice,” he told accountants in 2014. “I encourage you to always work responsibly, fostering relationships of loyalty, justice, if possible, of fraternity, bravely confronting especially the problems of the weakest and of the poorest. It is not enough to give practical answers to economic and material questions. It is necessary to generate and cultivate ethics of economy, of finance and of employment; it is necessary to maintain the value of solidarity— this word which today risks being taken out of the dictionary—solidarity as a moral approach, an expression of attention to others in all their legitimate needs.”
“There is a stronger temptation to defend one’s interest without concern for the common good, without paying much heed to justice and legality,” the pope added. “For this reason everyone, especially those who practice a profession which deals with the proper functioning of a country’s economic life, is asked to play a positive, constructive role in performing their daily work.”
[...]
Pope Francis has urged accountants to combat financial corruption. “In your work, you accountants support businesses, but also single families, by offering your economic and financial advice,” he told accountants in 2014. “I encourage you to always work responsibly, fostering relationships of loyalty, justice, if possible, of fraternity, bravely confronting especially the problems of the weakest and of the poorest. It is not enough to give practical answers to economic and material questions. It is necessary to generate and cultivate ethics of economy, of finance and of employment; it is necessary to maintain the value of solidarity— this word which today risks being taken out of the dictionary—solidarity as a moral approach, an expression of attention to others in all their legitimate needs.”
“There is a stronger temptation to defend one’s interest without concern for the common good, without paying much heed to justice and legality,” the pope added. “For this reason everyone, especially those who practice a profession which deals with the proper functioning of a country’s economic life, is asked to play a positive, constructive role in performing their daily work.”
[...]
23 novembro 2016
Links
Iemen está adotando as IFRSs
Diversidade de gênero em economia
As edições dos verbetes da Wikipedia fazem a enciclopédia menos enviesada
Como o computador ajuda o jogador de xadrez
Intelectual, mas idiota!
But the problem is the one-eyed following the blind: these self-described members of the “intelligentsia” can’t find a coconut in Coconut Island, meaning they aren’t intelligent enough to define intelligence hence fall into circularities — but their main skill is capacity to pass exams written by people like them. With psychology papers replicating less than 40%, dietary advice reversing after 30 years of fatphobia, macroeconomic analysis working worse than astrology, the appointment of Bernanke who was less than clueless of the risks, and pharmaceutical trials replicating at best only 1/3 of the time, people are perfectly entitled to rely on their own ancestral instinct and listen to their grandmothers (or Montaigne and such filtered classical knowledge) with a better track record than these policymaking goons.
Indeed one can see that these academico-bureaucrats who feel entitled to run our lives aren’t even rigorous, whether in medical statistics or policymaking. They can’t tell science from scientism — in fact in their image-oriented minds scientism looks more scientific than real science. (For instance it is trivial to show the following: much of what the Cass-Sunstein-Richard Thaler types — those who want to “nudge” us into some behavior — much of what they would classify as “rational” or “irrational” (or some such categories indicating deviation from a desired or prescribed protocol) comes from their misunderstanding of probability theory and cosmetic use of first-order models.) They are also prone to mistake the ensemble for the linear aggregation of its components.
The Intellectual Yet Idiot is a production of modernity hence has been accelerating since the mid twentieth century, to reach its local supremum today, along with the broad category of people without skin-in-the-game who have been invading many walks of life. Why? Simply, in most countries, the government’s role is between five and ten times what it was a century ago (expressed in percentage of GDP). The IYI seems ubiquitous in our lives but is still a small minority and is rarely seen outside specialized outlets, think tanks, the media, and universities — most people have proper jobs and there are not many openings for the IYI.
Beware the semi-erudite who thinks he is an erudite. He fails to naturally detect sophistry.
The IYI pathologizes others for doing things he doesn’t understand without ever realizing it is his understanding that may be limited. He thinks people should act according to their best interests and he knows their interests, particularly if they are “red necks” or English non-crisp-vowel class who voted for Brexit. When plebeians do something that makes sense to them, but not to him, the IYI uses the term “uneducated”. What we generally call participation in the political process, he calls by two distinct designations: “democracy” when it fits the IYI, and “populism” when the plebeians dare voting in a way that contradicts his preferences. While rich people believe in one tax dollar one vote, more humanistic ones in one man one vote, Monsanto in one lobbyist one vote, the IYI believes in one Ivy League degree one-vote, with some equivalence for foreign elite schools and PhDs as these are needed in the club.
[...]
The IYI has been wrong, historically, on Stalinism, Maoism, GMOs, Iraq, Libya, Syria, lobotomies, urban planning, low carbohydrate diets, gym machines, behaviorism, transfats, freudianism, portfolio theory, linear regression, Gaussianism, Salafism, dynamic stochastic equilibrium modeling, housing projects, selfish gene, election forecasting models, Bernie Madoff (pre-blowup) and p-values. But he is convinced that his current position is right.
The IYI is member of a club to get traveling privileges; if social scientist he uses statistics without knowing how they are derived (like Steven Pinker and psycholophasters in general); when in the UK, he goes to literary festivals; he drinks red wine with steak (never white); he used to believe that fat was harmful and has now completely reversed; he takes statins because his doctor told him to do so; he fails to understand ergodicity and when explained to him, he forgets about it soon later; he doesn’t use Yiddish words even when talking business; he studies grammar before speaking a language; he has a cousin who worked with someone who knows the Queen; he has never read Frederic Dard, Libanius Antiochus, Michael Oakeshot, John Gray, Amianus Marcellinus, Ibn Battuta, Saadiah Gaon, or Joseph De Maistre; he has never gotten drunk with Russians; he never drank to the point when one starts breaking glasses (or, preferably, chairs); he doesn’t even know the difference between Hecate and Hecuba (which in Brooklynese is “can’t tell sh**t from shinola”); he doesn’t know that there is no difference between “pseudointellectual” and “intellectual” in the absence of skin in the game; has mentioned quantum mechanics at least twice in the past five years in conversations that had nothing to do with physics.
He knows at any point in time what his words or actions are doing to his reputation.
But a much easier marker: he doesn’t even deadlift.
The IYI is member of a club to get traveling privileges; if social scientist he uses statistics without knowing how they are derived (like Steven Pinker and psycholophasters in general); when in the UK, he goes to literary festivals; he drinks red wine with steak (never white); he used to believe that fat was harmful and has now completely reversed; he takes statins because his doctor told him to do so; he fails to understand ergodicity and when explained to him, he forgets about it soon later; he doesn’t use Yiddish words even when talking business; he studies grammar before speaking a language; he has a cousin who worked with someone who knows the Queen; he has never read Frederic Dard, Libanius Antiochus, Michael Oakeshot, John Gray, Amianus Marcellinus, Ibn Battuta, Saadiah Gaon, or Joseph De Maistre; he has never gotten drunk with Russians; he never drank to the point when one starts breaking glasses (or, preferably, chairs); he doesn’t even know the difference between Hecate and Hecuba (which in Brooklynese is “can’t tell sh**t from shinola”); he doesn’t know that there is no difference between “pseudointellectual” and “intellectual” in the absence of skin in the game; has mentioned quantum mechanics at least twice in the past five years in conversations that had nothing to do with physics.
He knows at any point in time what his words or actions are doing to his reputation.
But a much easier marker: he doesn’t even deadlift.
Fonte: aqui
Assinar:
Postagens (Atom)
Postagens
