Esta é a conclusão deste working paper:
Resumo:
Political corruption is considered a major impediment to economic development, and yet it
remains pervasive throughout the world. This paper examines the extent to which government
audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability.
We do so in the context of Brazil’s anti-corruption program, which randomly audits
municipalities for their use of federal funds. We find that being audited in the past reduces
future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent
legal action by 20 percent. We interpret these reduced-form findings through a political
agency model, which we structurally estimate. Based on our estimated model, the reduction
in corruption comes mostly from the audits increasing the perceived threat of the non-electoral
costs of engaging in corruption.
Keywords: Corruption, Audits, Political Selection, Political Accountability, Judicial accountability
Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt PoliticiansEric Avis, Claudio Ferraz, and Frederico Finan - July 2016
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