Situação Fiscal do Brasil

THAT governments splurge in election years is a hallowed democratic tradition. True to form, Brazil’s left-wing administration, led by President Dilma Rousseff who is seeking a second term in an election on October 5th, has gone on a spending spree. Just how big became apparent on September 30th, when the treasury released its August accounts.

The primary deficit (before interest payments) reached 14.4 billion reais ($5.9 billion) in that month, the fourth in a row in which the government has failed to put aside cash to pay creditors. The consolidated primary surplus in the eight months to August stood at just 0.3% of GDP. Most of that came from the states; the central government managed just 1.5 billion reais, a piffling 0.05% of GDP and the worst result for the period since 1998. The overall budget deficit climbed to 4% of output, the highest level since Ms Rousseff’s predecessor and mentor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, embarked on a huge stimulus package in 2009, as the global financial crisis took hold.

Part of the fiscal deterioration is a good sign, after a fashion. The government has at last decided to stop “pedalling”, as critics mockingly call the dubious procedure of putting off payments to state-owned banks charged with disbursing benefits such as unemployment insurance, or cash handouts for the poor (which Ms Rousseff raised three months ago). In recent months these lenders have had to finance such payments from their own funds. Now the treasury has finally footed the bill.

It does, however, mean that in order to meet the self-imposed primary-surplus target of 1.9% of GDP in 2014, all levels of government must save a total of 22.2 billion reais a month until the end of the year, an impossible task. A disappointing auction this week for fourth-generation mobile spectrum hardly helped. The treasury was hoping to rake in at least 8 billion reais; it only managed 5 billion reais. One reason was that the 4G sale, brought forward from 2016 to plump up state coffers this year, came too soon after an earlier one in 2012. Some operators stayed away as a result. Private-sector economists now reckon that the “structural surplus”, which excludes such one-off injections, has turned into a small deficit.

If Brazil is to keep its investment grade the next government will need to reverse this trend. A month ago Moody’s revised its outlook for government debt from stable to negative. On September 30th the ratings agency told an investors' conference in São Paulo that it will refrain from re-appraising Brazil’s credit risk until 2016, once it becomes apparent what the next government is doing to tackle weak growth (which will average just 1.5-1.7% a year during Ms Rousseff’s four years in power), and a wonky budget.

On paper, Marina Silva, candidate of the centrist Brazilian Socialist party, promises a more responsible fiscal policy. So does Aécio Neves of the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, the most market-friendly of the main contenders. If the latest polls are any guide, however, neither is likely to get a chance to implement a new course. Ms Rousseff, who in August trailed Ms Silva by as much as ten points in second-round simulations, now enjoys a healthy lead over either challenger, thanks to ample media exposure that has allowed her to play up successes and bash rivals.

Markets despair at the thought of Ms Rousseff’s re-election. On Monday they swooned after a poll released over the weekend showing the incumbent consolidate her lead and hinted at a possibility of an outright victory in the first round. Pricing in this (admittedly still remote) scenario, the stockmarket had its worst session in three years, falling by 4.5%. The shares of Petrobras, the state-controlled oil giant which was mismanaged on Ms Rousseff’s watch and the subject of corruption probes, plummeted by 11%. The real also weakened against the dollar; September saw it lose one-tenth of its value against the greenback, also the most since 2011.

For all the turmoil, Mauro Leos, in charge of Latin American sovereign ratings at Moody’s, reckons that a second Rousseff administration would in practice be little different from one led by Ms Silva. Ms Rousseff would have no choice but to rein in spending; her rival would face social pressure to row back on some of the belt-tightening implicit in her programme. (Mr Neves could probably stomach a bigger adjustment but despite a late uptick in the polls he will find it hard to pip Ms Silva to the run-off on October 26th—let alone beat Ms Rousseff.)

One lesson from the tizzy is that Ms Silva could expect a boost from investors: the real would probably strengthen if she won, and bond yields might narrow. Ms Rousseff, by contrast, is likely to face market headwinds that would make necessary reforms to public finances more painful still.

Fonte: aqui