Brasil: devedor líquido do mundo

Segundo reportagem do G1: 

O chefe-adjunto do Departamento Econômico do Banco Central, Fernando Rocha, avaliou, porém, que as reservas internacionais brasileiras ainda são maiores do que a dívida externa do país, o que confere ao país a posição de credor líquido , e que a dívida externa de curto prazo (até um ano) representa pouco mais de 10% do valor total do endividamento externo brasileiro. 

Meu comentário: Nominalmente as reservas internacionais brasileiras são superiores à dívida privada e pública com exterior (obrigações externas). No entanto, quando intervém no mercado de câmbio, o Banco Central utiliza contratos de swaps cambiais. . A reportagem abaixo explica de forma detalhada essas operações. O BC deve honrar esses contratos no futuro. Considerando o custo desses contratos, o Brasil não é mais credor do mundo desde Outubro de 2013.

Brazil: net debtor to the world 

Jonathan Wheatley 

Financial Times, January 16, 2014

How well protected is Brazil against external shocks? Perhaps not as well as is commonly thought. 

It has been a proud boast of Brasília for several years that it is a net creditor to the world because it holds more in foreign exchange reserves than it owes in overseas debt. However, it is far from clear that this is still the case. The issue is just one example of the vulnerabilities investors must include in their calculations of how Brazil and other emerging markets will fare as monetary policy in the developed world becomes less accommodating. 

Global liquidity has been a boon to Brazil for at least a decade. Before the crisis of 2008-09, global demand for Brazil’s commodities and the rise of millions of new consumers at home led to and fed off huge inflows of money. Since the crisis, the flows have continued thanks to quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve and other central banks in the developed world. 

The impact is clearly visible in Brazil’s foreign exchange reserves, which rose from about $35bn in 2001 to about $360bn by the end of last year. 

Combined public and private sector foreign debt was steady at about $200bn from 2001 until 2009 and then began to rise, reaching about $310bn by the end of last year. Nevertheless, thanks to the steady increase in foreign reserves, Brazil has been a net creditor since early 2009. 

Or has it? 

At about the same time as the country became a creditor, Brazil’s central bank began using a nifty new method of intervention on foreign exchange markets. Instead of buying and selling dollars on the spot market – the standard method of central bank intervention – it used currency swaps. This is a clever alternative because it achieves the same result as buying or selling dollars with no impact on the stock of reserves. 

When the bank uses such a swap to limit the depreciation of the real, it offers to pay the difference between the initial exchange rate and the final exchange rate during the period of the contract, plus a dollar-linked rate of interest (known to traders as the cupom cambial). In return, it receives the cumulative interbank interest rate (currently about 10 per cent a year) on the amount of the contract in Brazilian reals. Crucially, the contracts are settled entirely in reals. No dollars exchange hands and there is no obvious impact on the country’s ability to pay its foreign debts.

The method works because it satisfies demand for foreign exchange contracts by financial market participants looking to hedge foreign exchange exposure or to speculate on movements in the exchange rate. By doing so, it removes demand from the market and has the same effect on the exchange rate as if that demand had been met by buying or selling dollars. 

During several periods since the method was introduced, the central bank used it (in a mirror image of the contract described above) to limit the appreciation of the real, which was being driven up by the arrival of all that hard currency and undercutting the competitiveness of Brazilian exports. 

But when the US Fed began talking about tapering its QE programme last year, the real went on a slide. Since then, the central bank has upped its currency swap programme to a different order of magnitude. As Gabriel Gersztein and Thiago Alday at BNP Paribas in São Paulo pointed out in a recent note, between May 31 last year and January 10, the bank accumulated a short position on the US dollar through currency swaps of more than $77bn. 

You may well ask, so what? It is all done in reals, after all, so there is no impact on foreign reserves. But big bazookas don’t come cheap and you can’t support your currency to the tune of $77bn at no cost. 

And of course there is a cost. If the swaps are successful – and a central bank working paper published in July 2013 suggests they often are – then the bank may even make a profit on them. But what if the real continues to slide, in spite of the central bank’s heavy weaponry? The currency has shown some resilience since the panic went out of foreign exchange markets last September. But it has still weakened from R$1.95 to the dollar last March to about R$2.35 today. Every time its swap contracts go against it, the central bank – or rather Brazil’s national treasury – takes a hit. 

How big is that hit? If we assume there is no such thing as a free lunch, let alone a free big bazooka, we must also assume the cost is significant. Gersztein and Alday at BNP Paribas think a reasonable indication of the cost is to net out the central bank’s short dollar position through currency swaps from its foreign reserves. After all, it is not only the stock of reserves but also the broader health of the Brazilian economy that affects its ability to pay its debts. 

If we do that, we discover that, thanks to the use of its bazooka, Brazil ceased to be a net creditor to the world in October last year. The central bank’s latest figures, for November 2013, show external debt at $312bn and foreign reserves at $362bn, giving a cushion of $50bn. Net out its short position through swaps of $68bn at the end of November and the cushion is gone. 

That is something investors may wish to keep a close eye on if, as widely predicted, the real continues to weaken and Brazil’s fiscal position continues to deteriorate during 2014 and 2015.