Mais Ducha 2

Na quarta-feira, o International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) e a sua congênere dos EUA, o Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), realizaram uma reunião conjunta para discutir o problema.

Vamos poupar o suspense. Ele terminou em lágrimas.

(...) IASB e FASB têm-se centrado no desenvolvimento de um modelo de perda esperada que forçaria os bancos a reservar o dinheiro para perdas antecipadas - ou seja, antes dos empréstimos realmente começam a piorar.

Mas a reunião de quarta-feira terminou com o FASB se afastando da proposta.

‘If this is going to unravel…’ - Tracy Alloway - Financial Times

Para o leitor do blog, apresento abaixo a transcrição do diálogo entre Seidman (do FASB) e Hoogervorst (do IASB) - também citado na postagem anterior:

HH: (...) I would also like to say that, if this is going to unravel, I find it for us as standard setters, not just us but also for you, I think it is deeply embarrassing. That in three efforts, in which we have looked at at least ten alternatives, in which we have left no stone unturned, that after three years we are still not able to come up with an answer. I would really find that unacceptable. So I would really hope that when your staff does this outreach they do it with an attitude of getting things fixed and not to let it unravel.


LS: Hans in response to that I would say that as standard setters our due process procedures are to discuss our evolving conclusions with stakeholders and make sure that they perceive it as an improvement in financial reporting, and that they can understand it… and the message I would send to those stakeholders is that we have heard the widespread confusion and questions and we plan to address them before we move forward with an exposure draft. I think the time we will take over the next couple of months to bring clarity to this situation will end up with a more efficient process than were we to go out with an ED now, as desirable as that might be, with a clear understanding now of the feedback that we expect to hear. Our desire here is very much still to try and reach as converged solution here as quickly as we can but in light of the very basic feedback we have heard we feel it is our responsibility to address this.


HH: Well I would just like to remind you that when our colleagues the prudential regulators, who created Basel 3 I think two years ago, when they came to their final conclusions they had the whole banking industry kicking and screaming telling them that the whole thing would go under. I don’t hear that now from our constituents. We still hear questions but none of them are such questions that we have a feeling that we are completely on a dead end street. All I want to say that at some point you have to come to conclusions, and if we are not able to come to conclusions after three attempts, and need yet another attempt in which I cannot think of any alternatives that we have not looked at yet, then we really have done our job very poorly.